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Abstract
In 1994, Maudlin proposed an objection to retrocausal approaches
to quantum mechanics in general, and to the transactional interpre-
tation (TI) in particular, involving an absorber that changes location
depending on the trajectory of the particle. Maudlin considered this
objection fatal. However, the TI did not die; rather, a number of re-
sponses were developed, some attempting to accommodate Maudlins
example within the existing TI, and others modifying the TI. I argue
that none of these responses is fully adequate. The reason, I submit,
is that there are two aspects to Maudlins objection; the more readily
soluble aspect has received all the attention, but the more problematic
aspect has gone unnoticed. I consider the prospects for developing a
succesful retrocausal quantum theory in light of this second aspect of
the objection.
1 Retrocausal quantum mechanics
Cramers (1986) transactional interpretation (TI) begins from the observa-
tion that relativistic versions of the quantum mechanical equation of motion
admit both retarded solutions waves propagating towards the future and
advanced solutions waves propagating towards the past. The advanced so-
lutions are usually discarded as unrealistic, but Cramer suggests incorporat-
ing them into an interpretation of quantum mechanics.
As a simple illustration, let us apply the TI to the experiment shown in
gure 1. A particle is emitted by a source S at time t0, passes through a
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Figure 1: A simple experiment.
beam-splitter BS, and is absorbed either by absorber A or by absorber B
at time t1. According to the TI, at t0 the source emits a retarded wave
the o¤er wave in the direction of the beam splitter, where it is split into
two equal-amplitude components that travel to A and B respectively. The
arrival of an o¤er wave at A at t1 triggers the emission of an advanced
wave of the same amplitude and phase the conrmation wave travelling
back towards the source at t0. The same process occurs at B. The arrival
of the initial conrmation waves at the source at t0 triggers the emission
of a new o¤er wave, and the cycle repeats until all the quantum boundary
conditions are satised. Since one of the boundary conditions is that all the
energy is transferred to one absorber, the resulting wave conguration the
transaction is established either between S and A or between S and B. The
probability of each transaction is given by the amplitude at S of the initial
conrmation wave returning from the relevant absorber, so in this case the
probability of each outcome is 1/2.
The incorporation of advanced waves is mathematically satisfying because
it avoids throwing away half the solutions to the equation of motion. But
it also allows a uniform treatment of several puzzling quantum phenomena,
treated at length in Cramer (1986). In particular, since the advanced con-
rmation wave can transmit information about the measurements that are
to be performed on a particle back in time to the particle source, no non-
local inuences are required to explain the results of EPR-Bell experiments
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(1986, 667). Several other interpretations of quantum mechanics have been
developed to exploit this retrocausal strategy, including those of Price (1994),
Sutherland (2008) and Wharton (2010).
But the TI and other retrocausal approaches are challenged by Maudlin
(1994). Maudlin o¤ers two arguments, an initial objection is aimed at the
particular theoretical structure of the TI, and a more general challenge aimed
at retrocausal theories in general. I will take them in turn.
2 Pseudotime and explanation
Maudlins initial objection concerns the status of the pseudotime narrative
the TI story about how the transaction is established. On the surface, at
least, the pseudotime narrative provides the central explanatory mechanism
of the TI; o¤er waves are sent forwards in time from the particle source
to the potential absorbers, and then each absorber returns a conrmation
wave backwards in time to the source, and then the process repeats until
a transaction forms along one o¤er-conrmation pair. Maudlin regards this
explanatory mechanism as problematic. The locution and then in the
pseudotime narrative cannot be understood temporally, because the events
connected by this locution zigzag back and forth in time. Neither can it be
understood causally, because only the completed transaction actually exists,
so the o¤er-conrmation process that precedes it in the pseudotime narrative
never actually occurs. But then how should we understand it? Cramer himself
backs away from taking the pseudotime narrative literally, describing it as
only a semantic convenience, a useful ction (1986, 663). Maudlins rst
objection to the TI is that Cramer cannot a¤ord to make such a concession.
Taken literally, the pseudotime narrative is incoherent, but since all of the
seeming illumination provided by the account depends on the pseudotime
narrative, the TI without the narrative fails as an explanatory theory (1994,
198).
But is Maudlin right that the pseudotime narrative provides all the illu-
mination of the TI? This seems unfair, as immediately following Cramers
concession that the pseudotime narrative is a useful ction he provides an
alternative way of understanding of the TI that makes no appeal to the
pseudotime narrative whatsoever: An equally valid interpretation of the
process is that a four-vector standing wave has been established between
emitter and absorber(1986, 663). That is, given that nature contains both
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advanced and retarded waves, and given that the arrival of a retarded o¤er
wave triggers the emission of an advanced conrmation wave and vice versa,
what we should expect to see is a standing wave between the source and
an absorber composed of an advanced and a retarded component. After all,
anything other than a standing wave would be inconsistent, ascribing distinct
wave amplitudes successively to one and the same spacetime point. Hence
one can bypass the pseudotime narrative, and simply appeal to consistency
as an explanation of the completed transactions one sees. The advanced and
retarded waves of the TI have a crucial role in this explanation, as compo-
nents of the standing wave, but this role is not the one they play in the
pseudotime narrative.
However, the standing wave explanation does not yield the probabilities
with which we see each of the possible completed transactions, so in this
sense the explanation is incomplete. But quantum probabilities are rarely
explained; except for a controversial research program in many-worlds quan-
tum mechanics (Deutsch 1999), quantum theories typically stipulate a rule
for ascribing probabilities to outcomes rather than explaining that rule. So
the TI is in good company here. Perhaps the easiest way to state the rule is
in terms of the pseudotime narrative; if an o¤er wave from the source were to
produce conrmation waves from every absorber, the probability of a trans-
action is the amplitude of at the source of the conrmation wave from the
relevant absorber. But this appeal to a fragment of the pseudotime narrative
is entirely instrumental; it simply provides a straightforward mathematical
recipe for assigning probabilities to trajectories.
So Maudlin is wrong that the pseudotime narrative is essential to the TI;
one can eliminate the pseudotime narrative as a causal explanation without
sacricing the illumination that the TI approach provides. But Maudlin is
also remiss, I think, in implying that the pseudotime narrative can provide
no illumination because it is an inconsistent ction. Fictions, even inconsis-
tent ones, can provide a kind of illumination. In particular, the pseudotime
narrative provides a way to come to the realization that only a standing
wave solution is possible, even if it cannot be the causal mechanism by which
those standing waves come about. So it seems entirely apt for Cramer to
describe the pseudotime narrative as a semantic convenience and a peda-
gogical convention(1986, 661); nothing like the pseudotime narrative could
actually occur as a causal process, but nevertheless this ction is a good way
for students to discover for themselves why standing wave solutions are what
we observe, and in this way the ction provides illumination.
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Figure 2: Maudlins experiment.
So Maudlins initial complaint against the TI is, I think, misplaced. But
he does not rest his case on this objection, since the pseudotime narrative
and its problems are peculiar to Cramers theory, and might well not arise in
some other account which employs backward causation(1994, 199). Rather,
since he intends to rule out retrocausal theories more broadly, he rests his
case on a nal problem of greater scope which will arise for any stochastic
theory of this sort(1994, 199). This is the challenge to which I now turn.
3 Maudlins challenge
Consider the experiment shown schematically in gure 2. A particle is
emitted at time t0. If it follows the lower path it is detected by absorber A
at time t1. If it follows the upper path then A does not detect a particle at
t1, which triggers an absorber B to be swung from its initial position behind
A to a point on the upper path, where it detects the particle at a later
time t2. Now what happens if (by means of the beam-splitter BS) a particle
is produced in a symmetric superposition of following the lower and upper
paths? Standard quantum mechanics tells us that there is a 50% chance that
the particle is detected at A and absorber B stays put, and a 50% chance
that absorber B swings round and the particle is detected at B.
How can the TI account for these statistics? Consider rst what hap-
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pens if one attempts to apply the pseudotime narrative. The puzzle here is
that the equiprobability of the two outcomes demands that equal amplitude
conrmation waves be received from absorber A and absorber B. But if B
sends back a conrmation wave, then it must have been struck by an o¤er
wave, so it must have swung round. And if it has swung round, then the
particle is not detected at A. So when a conrmation wave is received from
absorber B, the particle must always go to absorber B, despite the fact that
the amplitude of the conrmation wave is 1/2. That is, even considered as a
useful ction the pseudotime narrative fails us, since it assigns inconsistent
probabilities to one and the same event.
Nor does the TI fare much better if we attempt to apply the standing-
wave interpretation instead. There is no problem with the standing waves
themselves; one consistent solution is a standing wave from S to A along
the lower path, and the other is a standing wave from S to B along the
upper path. The problem is that the recipe for ascribing probabilities to
these outcomes is precisely the inconsistent fragment of the pseudotime nar-
rative just discussed; the particle denitely goes to B if it has a probability
of 1/2 of going to B. The inconsistency arises because the conguration of
the absorbers is contingent the location of B depends on what happens at
A whereas the TI takes the conguration of absorbers as xed boundary
conditions. As Maudlin notes, the TI recipe for ascribing probabilities as-
sumes that the absorbers represent a xed eld of possibilities among which
the emitter can choose(1994, 199). If the absorbers arent xed, the recipe
yields inconsistent results.
This di¢ culty is not limited to the TI, but applies to any theory that
incorporates both advanced and retarded causal inuences. Just as the re-
tarded causal inuences are ill-dened without a xed conguration of parti-
cle sources, so the advanced causal inuences are ill-dened without a xed
conguration of particle absorbers. In Maudlins example, the absorbers
move based on earlier events, so no single set of advanced inuences can be
ascribed to the system. But neither can one ascribe one set of advanced
inuences at one time and another set of advanced inuences at another, on
pain of contradiction. Maudlin concludes that Cramers theory collapses
(1994, 200), and since any theory in which both backwards and forwards
inuences conspire to shape events will face this same challenge(1994, 201),
the entire retrocausal program in quantum mechanics collapses too.
But the TI has not collapsed; a variety of responses have been developed,
either claiming to accommodate Maudlins example within the existing TI,
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or modifying the TI to accommodate it. I run through these responses in
the next section, and argue that none of them is satisfactory. The reason,
I contend, is that there are two elements to Maudlins challenge that have
not been clearly distinguished. Distinguishing them allows us to evaluate the
TI much more clearly; some aspects of it can remain in an adequate theory,
while other aspects must be modied. Neither has the retrocausal program
in quantum mechanics collapsed; indeed it is ourishing through the work
of Price (1994), Sutherland (2008) and Wharton (2010), among others. The
evaluation of the TI in light of Maudlins challenge allows us to judge these
alternative retrocausal approaches as well.
4 Extant responses
Of the extant responses to Maudlins challenge, Berkovitz (2002), Kastner
(2006) and Marchildon (2006) attempt to accommodate Maudlins example
within the existing TI, and Cramer (2005), Kastner (2010) and Chiatti (2012)
work with modied versions of the TI. I will start with the former.
Berkovitz (2002) points out that given common views about probabilistic
causality, the TI applied to Maudlins example involves a causal loop, since
the conrmation wave returning backwards in time from B is necessary (and
su¢ cient) for the particle to be emitted towards B. Berkovitz then notes that
in causal loops the relative frequencies of events can di¤er signicantly from
their objective chances. So in this case, the fact that the particle always takes
the upper path when B swings round is not inconsistent with the upper path
having an objective chance of 1/2. However, it is not clear that Berkovitz
intends his analysis as a defense of the TI; he notes that since the link between
objective chance and long-run frequency is broken, the TI fails to predict the
long-run frequencies of outcomes. Rather than containing an inconsistent
recipe for ascribing probabilities to outcomes, the TI contains no such recipe
at all. This is not a way forward for the advocate of the TI.
Kastner (2006) identies the following as a problematic aspect of Maudlins
example; if absorber B does not swing round, then the o¤er wave on the upper
path heads into space, and no conrmation wave is received from the upper
path at the source. Typically in the TI, the conrmation waves returning
from a complete set of absorbers cancel out to the past of the initial emission
event. But in this case, the absence of a conrmation wave from the upper
path means that the conrmation wave from the lower path propagates into
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the past, prior to t0. On the other hand, if B does swing round, then there is
a complete set of absorbers, and the conrmation waves do cancel out prior
to t0.
The lesson Kastner takes from this is that the emission event is not suit-
able as a starting-point for the TI analysis, since this event and its past
depend on whether B swings round or not, i.e. on the outcome of the exper-
iment. Instead, Kastner takes the o¤er-conrmation wave pair on the lower
path as the starting point of her analysis, since this pair exists whether B
swings round or not. The conrmation wave here has an amplitude of 1/2,
and so Kastner reasons that the corresponding transaction in which the
particle takes the lower path where it is absorbed by A has a probability of
1/2. But the only other possibility is that the particle takes the upper path
where it is absorbed by B, so this also must have a probability of 1/2. This
recovers the standard quantum mechanical probabilities.
But this account is problematic in two regards. First, events prior to the
emission event do not depend on the outcome of the experiment as Kastner
claims; everything up to the emission event is exactly the same whether
the particle is absorbed by A or by B. So something must be amiss if her
analysis entails this about the past. Second, it is straightforward to modify
Maudlins example so that Kastners strategy is unavailable. Suppose that
if the particle is not detected at A, then not only does B swing round to
the upper path, but A swings down out of the lower path. Now there is no
o¤er-conrmation pair that exists whether or not the particle is detected at
A; if it is detected, then only the o¤er-conrmation pair to A exists, and if
it is not, then only the o¤er-conrmation pair to B exists.
Marchildon (2006) corrects Kastners point about the past. He notes
that when B does not swing round, the o¤er wave along the upper path
is still absorbed somewhere; a particle taking this path would be absorbed
by something eventually. Due to the retrocausal nature of the pseudotime
sequence, it makes no di¤erence how far in the future this absorption event
lies; the conrmation wave is still received by the particle source at t0. One
may as well assume that there is a third absorber C, situated on the upper
path beyond the point B swings to. Hence a complete set of conrmation
waves is received at the particle source whether or not B swings round, and
in either case the conrmation waves cancel out prior to t0.
Maudlins example remains problematic, however; if B does not swing
round, the new absorber C returns a conrmation wave with amplitude 1/2,
and yet no transaction is ever completed with C. Marchildon attempts to
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dissolve this problem by appealing to the four-dimensional spacetime implicit
in the TI; the future, though not predictable, is well dened(2006, 427).
The four-dimensional blockworldis subject to consistency conditions, and
in the present case, these conditions are that B absorbs the particle if and
only if A does not absorb it(2006, 427). Given this consistency condition,
there are just two possible trajectories, and each is ascribed the probability
corresponding to the amplitude of its respective conrmation wave, i.e. 1/2.
Marchildon is right that there are two possibilities in spacetime; these
are the four-dimensional standing waves discussed above. But recall that
the ascription of probabilities to these possibilities requires an appeal to a
fragment of the pseudotime narrative, even if it is only taken as an instru-
mental recipe. Marchildons account retains the inconsistency in this recipe
regarding absorber B; absorber B denitely receives the particle if it has a
probability of 1/2 of doing so. Furthermore, his account adds a new in-
consistency regarding absorber C; absorber C denitely does not receive the
particle when it has a probability of 1/2 of doing so. The contradiction at
the heart of Maudlins challenge remains.
So maybe there is no way to accommodate Maudlins example within the
TI as it stands; if we want to rescue the theory, perhaps we need to modify the
recipe for ascribing probabilities to outcomes. Cramer (2005) attempts to do
just that by modifying the way that pseudotime explanations are constructed.
In the standard TI, all possible transactions have the same status; what
Cramer proposes instead is a hierarchy of possible transactions, ordered by
the spacetime interval covered by the transaction. That is, transactions with
shorter spacetime interval are given the opportunity to form or not form
before (in pseudotime) those with longer spacetime interval. This takes
care of Maudlins example, since the possible transaction with absorber A
is decided rst. The pseudotime sequence now goes like this: The o¤er-
conrmation pair to absorber A is treated rst, and since it has amplitude
1/2, there is a probability of 1/2 of a transaction forming with A. If it fails
to form, then absorber B swings round, and the o¤er-conrmation pair to
absorber B can be considered; it too has amplitude 1/2, corresponding to a
probability 1/2 of this transaction forming.
But the hierarchical pseudotime sequence envisioned here is not a general
solution to the problem. For one thing, it will not work for Maudlin-type
experiments involving photons, since in that case the spacetime interval for
every possible transaction will be zero. (To construct a Maudlin-type exper-
iment using photons, absorber B will have to start closer to the upper path
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if it is to swing into place in time!) For another, it seems to have di¢ culty
handling interference experiments. Consider a two-path interference experi-
ment (using particles other than photons) in which one path is exactly one
wavelength longer than the other. According to Cramers proposal, one con-
siders the possible transaction along the shorter path rst. This transaction
has a 50% chance of forming, and if it forms, then no transaction forms along
the longer path. But this is inadequate to the phenomena; it is crucial to the
empirical adequacy of the TI that the transaction in interference situations
forms along both paths simultaneously. In interference situations, the space-
time interval of the two possible paths has to be irrelevant to transaction
formation.
Kastner (2010) suggests that the way to retain the status of pseudotime
histories as genuine explanations is to adopt a modal realist ontology; all
possible transactions exist in a (real) space of possibilities. She calls the
resulting modication of the theory possibilist TI (PTI). But it is not
clear that reifying the possible transactions helps with Maudlins challenge
in fact, it brings his criticism into sharper focus. If the pseudotime sequence
describes a genuine process occurring in a space of possibilities, then the
inconsistencies in the pseudotime sequence for the Maudlin example cannot
be waved away.
Chiatti (2012) regards the TI pseudotime sequence as superuous, since
he thinks that the structure of transactions can be found within the formal-
ism of standard quantum mechanics. The way to do this, he argues, is to
adopt an ontology of particle creation/destruction events; these are the only
events that physically exist, and the TI o¤er and conrmation waves are
a mathematical ction suited to calculate the statistics of the connection
between a pair of events (2012, 2). The physical universe is regarded as a
network of particle creation/destruction events, with the TI o¤er and conr-
mation waves serving only to coordinate the statistical relations among these
events.
Chiatti claims that in this context, Maudlins argument is unfounded be-
cause the two possible transactions have di¤erent events at their extremities;
absorption by A is a di¤erent event than absorption by B. Di¤erent extremal
events entail di¤erent TI-style analyses, and hence we have two simple ap-
plications of the theory, not one paradoxical one. This decoupling of the
problem fails to show how the event of B-absorption is related to that of A-
absorption. However, Chiatti has a suggestion here, namely that the event
(not A)+(not A)  is itself a transaction termination (null interaction), so
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that the second transaction assumes as its input the output state of the
rst(2012, 28). The suggestion is that the event of a particle not being ab-
sorbed by A can serve as the terminal event of a transaction, with probability
1/2, and this event can also serve as the initial event of a second transaction
that ends with a particle absorbed by B. The trouble with this suggestion is
that a null interaction a particle failing to be destroyed is not a physical
event in Chiattis ontology, so it is hard to see how it can serve as the ter-
minal event in a transaction. There are not two back-to-back transactions
here, but a single transaction with a complex structure.
5 The rst challenge
It looks like none of the extant responses to Maudlins challenge are adequate.
The feature of Maudlins argument to which all commentators have been
attempting to respond is the contingent nature of the absorber structure
the fact that the locations of the absorbers depend on the trajectory of the
particle. This is not surprising, since Maudlin himself describes his challenge
in these terms: This picture depends crucially on the idea that the absorbers
are somehow just sitting out there in the future, waiting to absorb... But
there is no reason for the absorbers to be xed in the future, una¤ected
by everything that happens in the present (1994, 199). However, I think
the contingent structure of the absorbers is only one element of Maudlins
challenge, and not the most problematic one.
First, note that Maudlins experiment involves a mixed quantum/classical
system; the particle is a quantum system, but the movable absorber is a clas-
sical (macroscopic) system. This, though, looks like an expendable feature of
Maudlins example; one could make all the subsystems quantum mechanical,
and still retain the contingent absorber structure. For example, consider the
variant of the experiment shown in gure 3. If a particle is emitted along the
lower path, it collides with a carefully-timed incoming anti-particle (dotted
line) at t1. The two particles annihilate, and the resulting photon is detected
at A. If a particle is emitted along the upper path, then clearly the anti-
particle doesnt encounter it at t1; instead, the antiparticle travels on, and
collides with the particle at a later time t2 on the upper path. This time the
resulting photon is detected at B.
The moving parts in this version of Maudlins experiment are all quan-
tum systems, but the absorber structure is just as in the original version,
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Figure 3: Maudlins experiment, quantum version.
with the anti-particle playing the role of the moving absorber. There is a
slight di¤erence, namely that in the original version there are two absorbers,
one of which moves, whereas in the new version there is just one moving
absorber. But this is unimportant; in the original version, it could just as
well be absorber A that moves to the upper path when it fails to detect
a particle on the lower path. So if it is the contingent absorber structure
that is the problematic aspect of Maudlins example, it ought to be just as
problematic in this version. But it does not appear so; one can construct a
fairly straightforward pseudotime narrative in this case that yields the right
probabilities.
Here is how it goes. A particle and an anti-particle are emitted at the
beginning of the experiment, so let us write the initial o¤er wave as jOip jOia.
The o¤er wave for the particle is split by the beam-splitter into two equal
components, following the lower path and upper path respectively; at this
stage, we can write the total o¤er wave as
1p
2

jLip + jUip

jOia : (1)
The o¤er wave for the anti-particle travels towards the lower path, where it is
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split into two terms depending on whether it meets the particle on the lower
branch or not. That is, the term jLip jOia in (1) evolves to jLip jLia, where
jLia is an o¤er wave for the anti-particle that encounters the particle on the
lower branch. The term jUip jOia in (1) evolves to jUip jUia, where jUia is an
o¤er wave for the anti-particle that travels onwards through the lower path
and encounters the particle on the upper path. Hence the superposition state
(1) as a whole evolves to the later(in pseudotime) superposition state
1p
2

jLip jLia + jUip jUia

: (2)
Each term returns a conrmation wave from the point at which the parti-
cle and anti-particle annihilate; the rst term returns a conrmation wave
1
2
hLjp hLja, and the second term returns a conrmation wave 12 hU jp hU ja.
Hence the (dual) source receives two conrmation waves, each with ampli-
tude 1=2, and a transaction forms along one of the o¤er-conrmation pairs
with probability 1=2 each. This pseudotime narrative hence successfully as-
cribes probabilities of 1=2 each to the two possible transactions the one in
which the particles annihilate on the lower path, and the one in which they
annihilate on the upper path.
Of course, one still may not want to take the pseudotime narrative lit-
erally, since the sequence of events it describes is neither a temporal nor a
causal one. The point is that the pseudotime narrative provides a consis-
tent recipe for ascribing probabilities to the two four-dimensional standing
waves that are the completed transactions. Hence the TI can account for the
standard quantum probabilities in contingent-absorber experiments without
any new di¢ culties or any modications. Why, then, has Maudlins example
been taken to be so problematic?
6 The second challenge
The reason is that the contingent absorber structure in Maudlins example
is not instantiated by quantum systems, but by classical (macroscopic) ob-
jects. As explained in the previous section, the straightforward and natural
response to the contingent absorber problem just sketched involves incor-
porating the absorber (the anti-particle) into the TI pseudotime analysis,
rather than treating it as part of the environment. But such incorporation
is far more problematic if we need to incorporate the state of a macroscopic
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object into our TI analysis. There are two tricky issues that arise when one
contemplates treating a macroscopic object as falling within the scope of a
TI analysis. The rst issue concerns whether the proposed analysis even
makes sense; it depends on the way in which TI practitioners conceive of
their theory. The second issue concerns the nuts and bolts of constructing
such an analysis, given that it makes sense.
To understand the rst issue, a little broad-brush history will help. In
broad terms, there are two traditions in the interpretation of quantum me-
chanics. The rst, harkening back to Bohr and Heisenberg, takes the dis-
tinction between the quantum world and the classical world as basic; call
this the Copenhagen tradition. According to this tradition, the world (or at
least, the part of it relevant to a given experiment) divides into system and
apparatus. The apparatus belongs to the world of experience, and behaves
classically. The apparatus delivers results which we take to be produced by
an unseen micro-world. Quantum mechanics does not describe the workings
of this micro-world directly, but rather describes what we should expect to
see when the apparatus interacts with the system. On this view, the sys-
tem/apparatus divide is built into the theory of quantum mechanics; the
observables of the theory correspond to the operations of applying various
pieces of macroscopic measuring equipment to the quantum system. Quan-
tum mechanics applies to the interaction between classical measuring devices
and quantum systems, and so any attempt to apply quantum mechanics to
the measuring equipment itself is fundamentally misguided.
The TI is naturally understood as part of this Copenhagen tradition as
a way of making it more precise. Emitters and absorbers are part of the
classical world; we arrange them in constructing an experiment, and we ob-
serve the results they present. TI quantum mechanics generates probabilistic
predictions based on the particular arrangement of emitters and absorbers
we have constructed. On this understanding of the TI, it is about the in-
teraction of an unseen quantum world with a given arrangement of emitters
and absorbers; the arrangement of emitters and absorbers constitutes the
environment in which the TI analysis takes place. If we understand the TI
in this way, of course, then the straightforward route to resolving Maudlins
challenge is blocked as a matter of principle; there is no way round.
But there is a second tradition in the interpretation of quantum mechan-
ics, stretching from Einstein and Schrödinger through Bell to Maudlin; call
this (without too much prejudice, I hope) the realist tradition. According
to this tradition, quantum mechanics really does describe the workings of
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the micro-world, not just system/apparatus interactions. The observables of
quantum mechanics should not be conceived in terms of measurement op-
erations, but in terms of actual properties of the quantum system; they are
beables rather than observables, in Bells memorable phrase (Bell 1987, 174).
On this view, there is no signicant distinction between the micro-world and
the macro-world; quantum mechanics applies just as much to the latter as
to the former, since macroscopic systems are built out of microscopic ones.
Hence quantum mechanics can be applied unproblematically to the measur-
ing devices themselves. There is no reason in principle why the TI cant be
thought of in these terms, and perhaps some of its proponents do so; Chiatti,
for example, writes that a piece of common matteris actually an aggre-
gate of transactions which take place in enormous numbers per second and
per cubic centimeter(2012, 18). Furthermore, there are other retrocausal
approaches to quantum mechanics that clearly fall into the realist camp, for
example the approaches of Price (1994), Sutherland (2008) and Wharton
(2010). If we think of quantum mechanics in this way, the rst tricky issue
is a non-issue; there is nothing in principle to prevent the incorporation of a
macroscopic absorber into a retrocausal analysis.
It is worth noting here that the realist tradition faces a problem that
doesnt arise in the Copenhagen tradition; quantum mechanics treats mea-
surements di¤erently from non-measurements (only the former trigger col-
lapse), but if measurements are themselves quantum processes this distinc-
tion cannot arise. Various responses to this measurement problem have been
developed, and it is interesting that all of them (or at least all the major ones)
treat Maudlins experiment by including absorber B in the system to be an-
alyzed. This is most obvious in the Everett (many-worlds) theory. Applying
Everett to Maudlins original experiment yields the following nal state:
1p
2

jLip jY iA jN;LiB + jUip jNiA jY; UiB

; (3)
where jY iA and jNiA are states of A in which it does and does not absorb a
particle, and jN;LiB and jY; UiB are states of B in which it doesnt absorb
a particle and remains on the lower branch, and does absorb a particle after
swinging to the upper branch. The existence of these two terms, according
to the Everettian, explains the observed results; in one branch of reality the
particle takes the lower path and is absorbed by A, and in the other branch
of reality the particle takes the upper path and absorber B swings round to
absorb it there. Bohms hidden variables theory tells essentially the same
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story, except that one branch is associated with the Bohmian particles, and
hence corresponds to the actual result. The GRW collapse theory appeals to
the instability of (3) under its collapse dynamics to account for the fact that
the nal state is (close to) one of the two terms. The lesson (to generalize a
little) seems to be that one has to incorporate absorber B into the quantum
mechanical analysis if one is to give any adequate account of the Maudlin
experiment.
As mentioned above, provided that the TI is seen as a direct account
of the micro-world in the spirit of the realist tradition, there is nothing to
prevent it doing just that. But the details of how this is to be accomplished
remain somewhat murky; this is the second tricky issue advertised above.
The immediate problem is that the TI analysis (as it stands) admits only two
kinds of end-points emission events and absorption events. To be subject to
TI analysis, particles must be followed from birth to death. But the particles
that make up the absorbers are not emitted at the start of the experiment
or absorbed at the end. If we have to know the full life-history of all the
particles that make up the absorbers before we can apply the TI, the theory
becomes impossible to apply.
However, the details of the evolution of the particles in the absorbers
before and after the experiment seem irrelevant to the analysis at hand. So
perhaps the TI can avail itself of the following harmless myth; pretend that
all the particles involved in the analysis are created at the beginning of the
experiment and destroyed at the end. This myth might be justied by ap-
pealing to the fact that wherever and whenever the particles in the absorbers
are actually created and destroyed, the o¤er and conrmation waves over the
course of the experiment will correspond to their mythical counterparts. If
that justication works, and the myth is adopted, then a pseudotime nar-
rative for Maudlins original experiment can be given along the lines of the
previous section.
Here is how it goes. According to the myth, the test particle and all the
particles in the absorbers are emitted at the beginning of the experiment. Let
us write the initial o¤er wave as jOip jNiA jN;LiB (using the same notation
as above), since initially A and B have not absorbed a particle and B is on the
lower path. The o¤er wave for the particle is split by the beam-splitter into
two equal components, following the lower path and upper path respectively;
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at this stage, we can write the total o¤er wave as
1p
2

jLip + jUip

jNiA jN;LiB : (4)
The term jLip jNiA jN;LiB in (4) evolves to jLip jY iA jN;LiB, and the term
jUip jN;LiB evolves to jUip jNiA jY; UiB; hence the superposition state (1)
as a whole evolves to the later(in pseudotime) superposition state
1p
2

jLip jY iA jN;LiB + jUip jNiA jY; UiB

: (5)
Note that (5) is exactly the same as the Everettian nal state (3). Applying
the myth again, we assume that the test particle and all the particles in the
absorbers are destroyed at this point, so that each term in (5) returns a conr-
mation wave; the rst term returns a conrmation wave 1
2
hLjp hY jA hN;LjB,
and the second term returns a conrmation wave 1
2
hU jp hN jA hY; U jB. Hence
the source receives two conrmation waves, and a transaction forms along one
of the o¤er-conrmation pairs with probability 1=2 each. This pseudotime
narrative successfully ascribes probabilities of 1/2 each to the two possible
transactions the one in which the particle takes the lower path and B stays
put, and the one in which the particle takes the upper path and B swings
round.
As before, one may not want to take this pseudotime narrative literally; it
is the fact that the narrative provides a consistent probability assignment to
the outcomes that is signicant. Taking a realist view of Maudlins example,
one can regard the TI as describing two possible four-dimensional standing
waves, standing waves that include both the particle and absorber B, with
the relevant fragment of the pseudotime narrative functioning as a recipe
for assigning probabilities to the two possibilities. Furthermore, one can
carry this lesson over to retrocausal approaches in general; as long as a given
retrocausal approach permits the application of quantum mechanics to the
motion of absorber B, Maudlins challenge is soluble.
7 Transactions and trajectories
The analysis just sketched constitutes what I take to be the most natural,
and perhaps the only, available solution to Maudlins challenge. But at what
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cost have we arrived at this solution? We have had to nd a way to incorpo-
rate pieces of measuring equipment into the TI analysis. Some may object
that we have left the TI behind at this point, since the TI is essentially a
Copenhagen-style interpretation. But whether the account sketched above
should count as a version of the TI is not of central concern; the main issue
is whether retrocausal interpretations in general can respond to Maudlins
challenge. Still, even from this broader perspective, some may nd the price
of incorporating macroscopic objects into the analysis too high, and with
good reason.
At issue is the uniqueness of classical trajectories in retrocausal quan-
tum mechanics. It is important to note that TI transactions are not always
particle trajectories. Two-slit interference is a case in point; the completed
transaction goes through both slits to a point on the screen, so the trans-
action is not a determinate particle trajectory, but a superposition of such
trajectories. In fact, this is a generic feature of interference; whenever two
or more distinct o¤er waves contribute to the amplitude at the absorption
point, the resulting transaction incorporates the trajectories corresponding
to all the o¤er waves to that point. So the TI does not always recover de-
terminate particle trajectories in the way that, for example, Bohms theory
does. But provided such indeterminacy is kept conned to the micro-world,
this is arguably not a problem.
The worry about incorporating macroscopic objects into the TI analysis
is that it opens the door for macroscopic objects to have indeterminate tra-
jectories. Thanks to decoherence, interference e¤ects are tiny for macroscopic
objects, but they do not go away entirely. So in my treatment of the Maudlin
experiment above, the amplitudes of the terms in (5) are a¤ected by the pres-
ence of anomalous interference terms. For example, there are low-amplitude
terms in which the particle takes the lower path, tunnels through absorber A
without triggering it, and then veers over to the upper path to be absorbed
by B. So in reality, the wave amplitude at the upper-path location for B
includes tiny contributions from o¤er waves that have not travelled via the
upper path. According to the TI, then, the completed transaction contains
a large contribution following the standard trajectory, but also minor contri-
butions following the anomalous trajectories. This might seem to threaten
the determinacy of trajectories for macroscopic objects, either rendering the
TI empirically inadequate or turning it into a baroque version of Everett.
But perhaps such worries can be deected; the additional terms are, after
all, very small. One might quite reasonably insist that a transaction in
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which one trajectory is so dominant simply is, for all practical purposes,
that trajectory. Provided that no signicant interference occurs involving
macroscopic objects, the determinacy of macro-trajectories is (arguably) safe.
However, there is a further worry that cannot be dealt with in this way. If
the TI is interpreted in the realist tradition, there is nothing to prevent it
being applied to the state of the universe as a whole (just as Everett, Bohm
and GRW can be so applied). Indeed, this is one of the touted advantages
of the realist tradition. We wouldnt need the myth for such an application;
we really would be following every particle from birth to death. But there
is no guarantee that interference between macroscopically distinct terms can
be suppressed in such an application; it depends on the global structure of
the universe. For example, in highly symmetric universes, branching in the
initial stages of the universe might be matched by reverse branching(i.e.
interference) in the nal stages. In that case, there would be no unique
trajectory corresponding to the evolution of the macroscopic objects in the
universe, and again the TI would either be empirically inadequate or reduce
to a version of Everett.
How far do these worries carry over to other retrocausal approaches? In
large part, the answer depends on the underlying ontology of the theory con-
cerned. Some retrocausal approaches, such as that of Wharton (2010), are
similar to the TI in that systems are modelled in terms of waves. So as in
the TI, we would need some assurance that the waves that represent macro-
scopic objects are always well localized, and this might ultimately depend
on cosmology. Other retrocausal approaches, such as that of Price (1994),
model systems entirely in terms of the properties of localized particles. Such
approaches are clearly immune to the concerns raised above, since all ob-
jects are always well localized in such models. A third set of retrocausal
approaches, such as the retrocausal Bohmian approach of Sutherland (2008),
models systems in terms localized particles that are guided by waves. These
approaches are also immune to the concerns raised above, since even if the
global wavefunction of the universe is a superposition of macroscopically dis-
tinct terms, the particles will all be associated with one of these terms.
These retrocausal approaches are all in their infancy, and time will tell
if the general strategy proves fruitful in understanding quantum mechanics.
The main point I hope to have defended here is that for any such approach,
provided it can be understood within the realist tradition in quantum me-
chanics, and provided it can be applied to model the trajectories of macro-
scopic objects, Maudlins challenge is not fatal.
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